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CONFLICT OF LAWS: FLORIDA FAILS TO ADOPT MODERN
APPROACH
Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972)
Plaintiff, a Florida resident, purchased a bus ticket in Tampa from defendant-bus company. While using the ticket, plaintiff was injured in a bus
accident in Tennessee. Twenty months later plaintiff instituted suit in the
circuit court of Hillsborough County, Florida. The court determined that
the Tennessee one-year statute of limitations barred the suit, and the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed., Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
of Florida HELD, while the counts sounding in tort were barred by the
Tennessee statute of limitations, the cause of action sounding in contract
was timely, since it arose in Florida and thus the Florida three-year statute
2
of limitations on contracts applied.
The traditional approach to conflict of laws is based on the theory of
"vested rights."3 The right of action of a party is created by the laws of the
place where a transaction occurs, and that jurisdiction's law determines all
substantive issues connected with that action.4 The rule of lex loci delicti,
the law of the place of injury, applies in tort actions. In contract actions,
however, lex loci contractus, the law of the place of making, determines the
construction or validity of a contract, while the law of the place of performance governs matters pertaining to performance.6 Whether a breach of contract has occurred and whether the promisee is entitled to damages are generally questions of performance and are governed by the law of the place of
performance. 7
Because of the practical difficulty of duplicating a foreign state's court
administrative procedure, matters of procedure are determined by the law of
the forum." Since statutes of limitation are a procedural matter affecting the
remedy of a party they are, in the absence of statutory exceptions, governed
by the law of the forum. 9 Many states, however, have limited the applicability
of the forum's statute of limitations by enacting borrowing statutes 10 that
1. Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 253 So. 2d 176 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
2. 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972). Two justices dissented without opinion, id. at 21.
3. R. LEFLAR, Tim LAW OF CONFLICr OF LAws 3 (student's ed. 1959).
4. Id.

5. Astor Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952); 2 V.

BEA.E,

THE

CoNmaer

§377.2 (1935).
6. Walling v. Christian & Craft Grocery Co., 41 Fla. 479, 27 So. 46 (1899); Castorri v.
Milbrand, 118 So. 2d 563 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
7. Peak v. International Harvester Co., 194 Mo. App. 128, 186 S.W. 574 (1916) and
cases cited therein. See also Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 751 (Fla.
OF LAws

1967).
8. Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920); 3 V. BEALE, supra note 5, §5842.
9. Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920); 3 V. BEALE, supra note 5, §604.2.
10. FLA. STAT. §95.10 (1971) provides: "When the cause of action has arisen in another
state or territory of the United States, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof
an action thereon cannot be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time,
no action thereon shall be maintained against him in this state."
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direct the court to apply the statute of limitations of the place where the
cause of action arose."1
In recent years courts and critics have expressed dissatisfaction with the
traditional rules of choice of law, 12 which they believe have induced courts
to fashion escape devices

3

to avoid the mechanistic result of the older rules.14

However, some courts have adopted modem conflicts theories that base
choice of law decisions on an analysis of various contacts and state interests with respect to each issue.15 These theories advance the underlying purpose of the substantive rule of the state that has a significant interest in seeing
its law applied or has the most significant relationship with the parties and
events. 16
Nevertheless, Florida has not joined the number of states that have discarded the rules of lcx loci delicti and lex loci contractus. In Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 7 the Florida supreme court attempted to abandon

the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in favor of a "significant contacts"
theory. However, on rehearing the court reversed itself and refused to overrule
the older principles.18 Furthermore, decisions of the district courts of appeal
subsequent to Hopkins indicate that Florida courts will continue to follow
the rules of lex loci delicti"o and lex loci contractus.2°
11. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV.
33 (1962); Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960).

12.
(1963);

See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
V. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1949).

13. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928) (cause of action of passenger of rented auto involved in accident was characterized
as sounding in contract so Connecticut law applied). See also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959).
14. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REV. 959 (1952).
15. While there are many approaches, three doctrines have dominated critical discussion. First, the approach of the RESTATEMENT suggests that the state whose law should
be applied is the state having the most significant relationship with the parties and events
with respect to a particular issue. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§145,
188 (1971). Second, Professor Branierd Currie advocated an "interest analysis" approach that
stresses interpretation of the conflicting substantive rules to be applied in terms of the
purpose of those rules. Where the rules of two states are in conflict a state should apply
its own law if it has a legitimate governmental interest in doing so. B. CUIuE, SELECTED
ESSAYS

ON

THE

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1963).

Finally, the

choice-influencing

considerations

approach of Professor Leflar creates a checklist of factors that the court should evaluate in
determining the applicable law. These factors include predictability of results, maintenance
of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement of
the forum's governmental interests, and application of the better rule of law. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
16. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §145, comment d at 416, §188, comment c at 578.
17. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
18. Id. at 752.
19. Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968); Lescard v. Keel,
211 So. 2d 868 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 218 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1968).
20. Center Chem. Co. v. Avril, Inc., 392 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1968); State-Wide Ins. Co. v.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/14
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The instant case is the first conflicts decision by the Florida supreme
court since Hopkins. The lower court had allowed the plaintiff to plead
alternatively with claims sounding in tort and in contract. 21 On review the
supreme court was presented with the question of whether the Florida borrowing statute22 required the application of the Tennessee statute of limitations to any of the causes alleged. If the cause of action arose in Tennessee
and would be barred under Tennessee's statute of limitations, Florida's
borrowing statute similarly would bar an action in the Florida courts. Because the tort action arose at the place where the last act necessary to
establish liability occurred, the court concluded that the one-year Tennessee
statute of limitations barred the tort actions.23 However, relying upon a 1917
case that held the cause of action accrues at the place of completion of the
contract, 24 the court concluded that the contract was completed in Florida
by the purchase of the bus ticket. Thus, the contract cause of action arose in
Florida, rendering the borrowing statute inapplicable.25 The Florida threeyear statute of limitations on actions sounding in contract 2 made the complaint timely.
While the court's analysis of the applicability of the borrowing statute
in tort actions conforms with the weight of authority,27 its treatment of the
place of accrual of the contract action neither follows its own prior decisions
nor the majority view. In defining the place of accrual of an action for
breach of contract, Florida courts have held that the cause of action accrues
where the breach occurs. 28 Although a question of where the cause of action
arises under the borrowing statute has not been brought before the supreme
court previously, the Fifth Circruit Court of Appeals has applied the Florida
borrowing statute in a breach of warranty action.29 The circuit court concluded that it must look to the law of the state in which the breach (a heli-

Flaks, 233 So. 2d 400 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega Y Arminan,
207 So. 2d 33 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), aff'd mem., 211 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 980 (1968).
21. 265 So. 2d at 21, citing Doyle v. City of Coral Gables, 159 Fla. 802, 33 So. 2d 41

(1947).
22.

FLA. STAT. §95.10 (1971); see text accompanying note 10 supra.
23. 265 So. 2d at 21; see TENN. CODE ANN. §28-304 (1955).
24. Peters v. E.O. Painter Fertilizer Co., 73 Fla. 1001, 75 So. 749 (1917). This decision
arose in connection with a question of proper venue for an action for breach of warranty
on a sales contract. The acceptance and breach of the contract occurred in the same
county, and the court placed strong support for its result on the fact that the suit was
instituted in the county where he breach occurred. See Williams v. Scholfield, 144 So. 2d
89 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
25. 265 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla. 1972).
26. FLA. STAT. §95.11 (5) (e) (1971).
27. See Ester, supra note 11, at 47.
28. Like Peters v. E. 0. Painter Fertilizer Co., 73 Fla. 1001, 75 So. 749 (1917), these
decisions have arisen in regard to questions of proper venue. Producers Supply, Inc. v.
Harz, 149 Fla. 594, 6 So. 2d 375 (1942); Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934);
Williams v. Scholfield, 144 So. 2d 89 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962), cert. denied, 150 So. 2d 443
(Fla. 1963); Gates v. Stucco Corp., 112 So. 2d 36 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
29. Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968).
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copter crash) occurred to determine whether the action could have been
maintained in the foreign state's courts at the time it was filed in the Florida
courts. 30 In states whose borrowing statutes are applicable where the action

"arises" or "accrues" in a different jurisdiction, the majority of courts hold
that this refers to the place where the contract was to be performed.3'
Despite the apparent inconsistency with prior law, the result of allowing
plaintiff to maintain her action and applying Florida law to the issues of the
case is appropriate. However, the court needs a more solid basis on which to
rest its decision not only in the instant case but in future conflicts cases
where precedent may dictate other undesirable results. The newer theories
of conflict of laws would provide a flexible concept for the court to use.
The modern approaches replace the mechanical application of old rules
with analysis of the policies and interests at stake in the choice of law. 32
Although the traditional rules had a basis in social and economic policy, the
courts have obscured the reasoning behind the rules, thus failing to consider
the relevant facts that make a wise choice of law. 33 Consideration of all
relevant factors under the newer approaches would lead to the best practical
result. 34 While the method of determining the legitimate interests or most

significant relationship to the state may afford less predictability than rigid
rules, 3 5 the benefit of the modern approach is that the choice of law will
depend on the relevant facts of each issue with emphasis on the purpose and
policy behind the law.36 Furthermore, the traditional goal of predictability
of rules to be applied has no practical meaning where the parties are not
cognizant of the choice of law consequences arising out of the simple purchase
3
of a bus ticket. 7
Applying the modern theory to the instant case, Florida law would govern
the action. Plaintiff resided in Florida and purchased her bus ticket there
from defendant. She boarded defendant's bus in Tampa, surrendering herself
to the care of the defendant. Whatever expectations plaintiff may have had
with respect to defendant's duties, obligations, and manner of performance
of the contract of carriage were formed in Florida prior to her departure.
The bus trip passed through several states with the accident occurring in
30. Id. at 596.
31.

Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Reed, 223 F. 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 640

(1915) (in action for injuries in railroad accident, whether actions were ex contractu or
ex delicti, the cause of action arises in the state where the accident occurred). See also
Ester, supra note 11, at 50.
32. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Auten
v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964). This comment takes no position as to which of the new approaches,
outlined supra note 15, the court should adopt. What is important in all of these approaches
is the analysis by the court of the particular conflicts situation, rather than the mechanical
application of traditional rules.
33. W. COOK, supra note 12, at 45.
34. Leflar, supra note 15.
35. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954).
36. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 802 (1964).
37. Compare RESTATE MENT, supra note 15, §188, comment b at 576.
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Tennessee. While Tennessee has an interest in protecting its highways from
negligent drivers, it has no state interest in preventing plaintiff from recovering on her contract cause of action, which was based on rights and obligations
incident to the Florida contract. On the other hand, Florida has an interest
not only in protecting its citizens and assuring their just compensation for
injuries but also in preserving the rights and obligations created by a contract
made under Florida law.
Once the choice of substantive law has been made, then the choice of the
statute of limitations under the borrowing statute should conform to that
choice. 5 To allow application of Tennessee's statute of limitations when the
court has determined that Florida law governed the action is incongruous. 39
That result would mean that a procedural rule of a state having only
fortuitous contacts with the action would bar the substantive rights of plaintiff created under the law of the state having the greatest interest in the issue.
Borrowing statutes were enacted to prevent forum shopping and promote
uniformity of result by applying the statute of limitations of the state whose
substantive law would apply to the action under traditional rules.- These
purposes can be preserved adequately by a changed judicial construction of
the statute.41 The court should interpret the cause of action as arising, for
purposes of the borrowing statute, in the jurisdiction whose law applies, that
is, the state having the greatest interest in the action. Also, the legislature
could revise the borrowing statute to reflect a more flexible approach by
amending it to require the application of the statute of limitations of the
state whose substantive law applied to the issue.42
Although the Supreme Court of Florida rejected modem approaches to
conflict of laws in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.43 the instant case
reveals the dilemma in which the court is placed if it must rely on the traditional rules. Under analysis the result in this case does not conform to the
weight of authority. The action should have been barred by the Tennessee
statute of limitations. However, the court seemingly misapplied the law and
reached the better result of permitting the plaintiff to proceed with her
action. If strict uniformity and predictability have ceased to be the most
important considerations, then the newer approaches, which emphasize the
38. Comment, Choice of Law and the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict of
Rationales, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 754 (1971); Comment, The Impact of Significant Contacts
on the Pennsylvania Borrowing Statute, 72 DicK. L. REv. 598 (1968).
39. Comment, Choice of Law and the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict of
Rationales,35 ALBANY L. REv. 754 (1971).
40. Comment, The Impact of Significant Contacts on the Pennsylvania Borrowing
Statute, 72 DicK. L. REv. 598, 605-06 (1968).
41. Id. at 618.
42. The following proposed statutory revision of FLA. STAT. §95.10 (1971) would accomplish this objective:
When the cause of action against a person has been fully barred by the laws of the
state, territory of the United States, or foreign country whose substantive law is found to
apply to the action, no action shall be maintained upon that cause of action in this state.
See also Comment, supra note 40, at 617.
43. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
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relevant contacts and interests involved in a particular issue, will allow the
court more latitude in considering the individual conflicts problem than
will the mechanical application of outdated rules. Concededly, the significant
contacts or interest analysis approaches are not without their own difficulties.
What contacts are relevant, what state interests are important, and whether
these contacts or interests should be considered quantitatively or qualitatively
are still much disputed questions. Moreover, the Florida borrowing statute
must be reappraised to reflect the new policy of conflicts resolution. The
borrowing statute must direct application of the statute of limitations that
is consistent with the state whose substantive law will govern the action.
While the supreme court evidenced no inclination to change its mind on
conflicts resolution, the opinion in the instant case indicates that the court
should reconsider its position.
MARTHA CURTIS WARNER
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